The passage of the Affordable Care Act saw the creation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), a new approach to healthcare delivery moving from fee-for-service toward population health. This paper presents a case study of the Memorial Hermann ACO (MHACO), launched in response to the Medicare Shared Savings Program, with goals to align physician and hospital incentives, practice evidence-based medicine, develop care coordination, and increase efficiency. Building blocks included an affiliated primary care network, a clinical integration program (involving shared electronic medical record platforms and quality data reporting), and significant investments in information technology. Presented is the approach taken to form MHACO; the management structure, technology developed, and a 2-year experience. Incorporated in July 2012, the MHACO involved 22 000 Medicare patients. In 2015, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services released data showing a composite quality score between 80 and 85 (from a maximum 100) and nearly $53 million in total savings (or 11% of expected expenditure), making MHACO one of the most successful nationally.
I
n October 2010, the passage of the Affordable Care Act saw the advent of a new model of healthcare delivery with the creation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). Defined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as "groups of doctors, hospitals, and other healthcare providers, who come together voluntarily to give coordinated high-quality care to their Medicare patients," ACOs must care for a minimum of 5000 patients for at least 3 years. 2 Cost savings plus quality improvement are the end goal of the ACO model, with providers accountable for both cost and outcomes for a group of patients (population health). Payments are fixed per patient, based on averages. Currently, ACO groups will keep the payments minus the cost of care but not assume the risk if costs exceed revenue; however, this will change in the near future. 3 CMS projected that in the first 3 years, ACOs could save Medicare $960 million and a January 2015 announcement specifies targets for shifting Medicare payments from fee-for-service to ACOs. By March 2016, the government achieved its goal of having 30% of Medicare payments to go to ACOs, with its next target being 50% by the end of 2018.
The Affordable Care Act further established 3 subprograms under the ACO initiative: the Pioneer ACO Model (now closed to new applications), a pilot among 19 organizations that were early adopters; the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), which allows for providers to receive a portion of achieved cost savings; and the Advance Payment ACO Model, geared toward smaller groups and rural providers who may not have the capital necessary to undertake this model (Medicare provides upfront and monthly payments for such groups). Absent in the creation of ACOs were specific federal guidelines about management or infrastructure. ACOs can be run by different types of providers, including hospitals, doctors, and insurers. The initial investment needed to launch an ACO also means that smaller groups and institutions may need to merge in order to be functional. 5 The goal of this paper is to examine a case study of 1 ACO, our experiences, challenges, and successes, as well as to describe the role of the neurosurgery service. The Memorial Hermann ACO (MHACO) was started as part of the second wave of new ACOs, after the experience of the pioneer groups. During this phase, more than 400 new ACOs had formed. 6 Specifically, the MHACO entered the MSSP.
CASE STUDY: THE MEMORIAL HERMANN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
The Memorial Hermann Healthcare System has 11 acute care hospitals with 3600 beds in the greater Houston area and leads the region with a market share of 25%. The system works with employed physicians (the Memorial Hermann Medical Group), faculty physicians from the University of Texas Medical School in Houston, and private doctors in an affiliated Independent Physician Association (the Memorial Hermann Physician Network or MHMD). The ACO project was launched as a pilot, exploratory initiative, led by executives that administered MHMD, based on preparation already underway to practice population health under a fixed payment system. This project was free of financial risk; there could only be benefit if savings were achieved. MHACO goals were to (1) practice evidencebased medicine, eliminate care redundancies, effectively manage and control chronic conditions, and attend to high-risk patients; (2) develop risk-assessment tools and care coordination programs; and (3) align physician and hospital incentives.
Building Blocks
Memorial Hermann used existing building blocks to launch the ACO. The hospital had an organized, growing primary care network comprising mostly private practice doctors but including employed physicians. There were also efforts toward creating a patient-centered medical home, a concept in which focus shifts from prioritizing the convenience of the doctor to the convenience of the patient and improving care coordination. Crucial components of this environment include 24 h a day, 7 days a week access to a physician; same or next-day appointments; and communication with care teams through technological portals. The idea of a care "team" was also important, with social workers and other case management personnel working closely with doctors. A nurse manager, for example, could assist in following up with patients and preventing problems. Such processes are required to practice population health and need investment, administrative and information technology (IT) support, and physician cooperation.
A second building block was the Clinical Integration (CI) program, administered by MHMD. To become a part of CI, a practice had to install a common electronic medical record (EMR) platform and report quality data. Many physicians (more than 1000) enrolled in CI because there were benefits to association. Examples include administrative support in meeting IT and regulatory requirements such as meaningful use, and contracting leverage by being in a large group. A physician can also receive a bonus for CI participation (a review of regulations around CI is provided in the "A Review and Survey of NeurosurgeonHospital Relationships: Evolution and Options" paper, in this Supplement). 7 MHMD developed a process for doctors to undergo observation and investigation prior to membership.
Administrators go into offices to analyze policies, billing procedures, and determine how the team functions. Quality data must also be disclosed and examined before a physician can join.
A final building block was the creation and refinement of required IT. A major issue was the multiple EMR platforms in use, between inpatient and outpatient settings, clinical and billing systems, and large groups of doctors sharing different products. Although Memorial Hermann had already invested considerable resources to integrate data sources, it was still not possible to track and analyze all care delivery, quality, and cost data for any given patient, or group of patients. Therefore, the Memorial Hermann IS team had to develop a new application that allowed MHACO patients to be identified and tracked in a longitudinal fashion and that enabled the quality reporting required by Medicare.
Forming the ACO
CMS provides general guidelines for ACOs such as the required involvement of primary care doctors (PCPs) and a specified governance structure. An ACO has to become an independent organization with a separate board, although it can be a subsidiary of a larger healthcare institution. Board members have to include physicians practicing in the ACO (including a chief medical officer) and a Medicare patient representative. But the exact composition is not otherwise prescribed. The MHACO, a corporate subsidiary, developed a board of physicians (including the senior author DK), executives (including DL, CL, and DF), and one Medicare patient representative. An application was prepared and approved in July of 2012.
The MHACO comprised physicians who were already members of CI, reporting quality data and collaborating with care managers. The initial focus was on PCPs. A Compact was established whereby the MHACO outlined specifically how and to what extent shared savings would support physician efforts. In turn, physicians were asked to comply with requirements such as connection between their practice management and the performance databases; electronic submission of all claims and quality performance data; participation in all payer contracts with the CI network; participation in the development of and compliance with clinical protocols and guidelines; and attendance at CI meetings. Currently, about three-quarters of MHMD primary care physicians are part of the MHACO program. The PCPs were divided into 6 regions, each region with a leader that received a stipend. Otherwise, there were no payments for ACO involvement.
CMS then defines the patient population based on the roster of PCPs in an ACO (a PCP can only participate in 1 ACO). The initial roster of MHACO patients numbered 22 000. As more PCPs have joined, those numbers have increased. CMS then requires reporting of 33 different quality metrics for this population. At the end of a fiscal year, CMS calculates savings based on expected expenditures. This is done using a formula based on expected average spending on the patients enrolled in a specific ACO. If there are savings, one-half is returned to the ACO. CMS does not specify how such savings are to be shared, but requires a plan as part of the application. It also rates the ACO based on quality outcomes.
If the MHACO achieved shared savings, the plan was to have monies go to the hospital (for the investments required to form the ACO and for the development of new programs) and to physicians for distribution. For PCPs, a formula was devised that included the number of ACO patients cared for by that physician, as well as performance on quality metrics. For specialists, the bonus was based on participation in CI and performance on quality metrics. All such payments had to be approved by the Board.
Performance of the MHACO
MHACO has been in MSSP for 2 full years. In 2015, CMS released quality and cost data for the previous year. 8 MHACO achieved a composite quality score of 80 to 85 out of a maximum 100 ( Figure 1 ) and produced nearly $53 million in savings, which will result in a payment to MHACO of nearly $23 million (Figures 2 and 3) . These savings reflect approximately 11% less spending then expected for the enrolled Medicare beneficiaries. Based on these data, MHACO is currently the highest performing ACO nationally.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
National implementation of the ACO program has been rapid. Starting with 32 pioneer efforts fewer than 5 years ago, there are now 477 participating groups. An estimated 1 in 4 Medicare patients are enrolled in an ACO. 4 For many physicians, particularly specialists, these rapid changes may not be apparent. To date, the focus of ACOs has been on developing primary care networks. In Houston, referral patterns for specialists have been largely unaffected, and payments to specialists still come from Medicare on a traditional, fee-for-service basis. However, this will change going forward. ACOs are being moved from potential bonuses only to face downside risk as well (financial penalties for high cost). 9 Further, CMS will begin to alter ACO policies and regulations. For example, CMS is already analyzing different ways to set the annual expenditure baseline (or future capitation amount) apart from historical averages. 10 Such changes will make savings more difficult, and require increasingly stringent management of cost. The result will involve new approaches to specialty care, and a move toward integration and away from the current fee-forservice structure for specialists. Because commercial payers are starting to explore capitation models as well, there will be an acceleration of movement toward population health. The approach of the MHACO was to use existing physician networks involved in CI, already on common EMR platforms and reporting quality data. Significant investments in IT infrastructure and care coordination followed, and the result was success both in terms of savings (11% of estimated expenditure) and meeting performance benchmarks. To date, the MHACO has not formed a restricted network, tracked costs for individual patients, or tracked performance for individual physicians. Bonuses for physicians were based on numbers of patients treated and not performance (partly because obtaining such data presents immense logistical challenges). To move toward population health, further development of management structures and IT support will be required. The most sensitive step will involve the organization and selection of physicians. Who is in network and who is not? What is the governance structure? Which specialists will be involved? How will reimbursement and bonuses be allocated? What data will be tracked, and is it of high quality, credible to the physician? What is the balance between cost considerations and the autonomy to make treatment decisions? Establishing a cohesive, collaborative physician group that can make joint decisions, based on accurate data, move in a single direction, and increase both quality and efficiency will be the key to success.
There are clearly advantages to a population health approach. [11] [12] [13] [14] The ACO experience shows that significant savings are possible when both physicians and hospitals are incentivized to reduce cost performance on quality measures. In 2015, CMS released an initial, composite report on ACO performance 8 ; overall, the cost of care was reduced enough to pay out $300 million in shared savings (although this experience was not universal; 12 of 32 Pioneer ACOs failed to generate any savings, and some would have owed money to CMS in a financial-risk scenario). 6, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] The ACO model can also increase quality, or at least performance as measured by the required quality metrics (Figure 4) . 20 Of the original 32 Pioneer ACOs, 23 continued participation in year 2; each of these ACOs reported improvements in quality metrics. 21 Further, aggregate quality scores for ACOs were higher than for other providers who reported comparable data. 8 A truly capitated model could reduce wasteful administrative costs related to complex billing and collecting, and onerous regulations regarding what is and is not legal. 22 Also, provider groups might contract directly with large employers or even individual patients, eliminating an intermediary allowing for repurposing of insurance company profits.
For physicians, an MSSP-type approach could produce different revenue sources apart from professional fees. For specialists like neurosurgeons, compensation could reflect quality instead of just volume of procedures performed. Surgeons that practice to the highest standards, with stringent indications, low complications, and top clinical outcomes, would be most highly valued. However, there are risks, the most important of which involves clinical care. While no one will object to reducing overutilization, there will be financial incentives to provide less care or try to select healthier patient populations. How do we ensure that physicians focus on efficiency but provide all necessary care? How do we prevent antagonistic interactions between physicians and patients over utilization? How do we ensure that groups do not compete for younger, more educated patients, and try to exclude those likely to incur high costs?
In addition, a movement toward tightly controlled and narrow networks will limit options available to a patient. Even in a large city, there will be certain procedures that only 1 or 2 neurosurgeons can perform with facility. There will be rare conditions where few have experience. Will access be limited? What about service, when competition is reduced at the individual physician level? The current open referral system preserves options and provides 1 form of quality control. Large, successful practices are the rewards for a surgeon or group that achieves exemplary results and provides ready availability. In addition, providers in a fee-for-service model are incentivized to work hard and provide timely care.
Finally, there are financial risks as well. 23 Since shared savings is based on immediate past average expenditures per Medicare beneficiary, what happens if all groups reduce cost and the averages decrease? Or if CMS develops a different methodology, then progressively reduces the capitation amount? What about regional differences? There is already evidence that ACOs in certain geographic locations or low-cost areas are disadvantaged in achieving savings. 24, 25 What is the Role of the Neurosurgeon?
Currently, ACO administration is focused strongly on the PCP. A PCP must join 1 ACO exclusively, but that does not apply to the specialist. Further, MSSP rules stipulate that ACOs must provide adequate access to specialist care and exempt specialists from downside risk. 26 Because MSSP rules state ACO patients can obtain specialist care from the provider of their choice, many specialists do not see ACO affiliation as necessary for ensuring referrals. However, this situation will change. In the near future, CMS is likely to mandate specialist participation in ACOs. 12 Further, ACOs themselves are starting to address the role of specialists. 27 In the early stages, the focus is on referral patterns and care management. PCPs are encouraged to use specialists only when truly necessary and utilize those who operate under lower cost styles. Those specialists are likely to be paid on a fee-for-service basis. In the next stage, certain specialists will be incorporated into the ACO, particularly around conditions that involve high rates of hospitalization and readmission because they present the greatest opportunity for savings (example: patients with diabetes or heart failure). These specialists will be paid differently, and participate in bonus plans. Their performance data will be tracked, similar to PCPs, and the data will be used to improve performance and gaps in services. A final step will be to incorporate all specialists, including tertiary hospital-based specialists like neurosurgeons (an exception will involve rural areas or other situations where the numbers of neurosurgeons are limited). Some groups will become large enough to provide comprehensive care and practice population health. 28 Neurosurgeons will have an important role to play in any ACO. The availability of neurosurgery is critical for any comprehensive approach, which should include high-end services like coverage of Level 1 Trauma Centers, the ability to treat cerebrovascular disease and brain tumors, and pediatric expertise. Further, spine care is prevalent and expensive, and neurosurgeons increasingly perform most of the spine surgeries (at Memorial Hermann, the neurosurgical share is 70%). Because the performance of any ACO is dependent on overall patient spending, the quality and efficiency of the neurosurgery practice will affect overall cost. How a neurosurgeon might contract or affiliate with an ACO is not currently specified. How shared savings might be designated to a neurosurgeon is not specified. Depending on the location, institution, and particular ACO, these relationships are likely to differ greatly (presenting opportunities for neurosurgeons to lead, but also risks if decisions are made without involvement). Because CMS does not specify how savings are shared, a neurosurgeon needs a "seat at the table" and should lead ACO development involving specialists.
At Memorial Hermann, the neurosurgery service was an early participant in CI and provided significant leadership in increasing collaboration between physicians and the hospital system. Many processes developed by neurosurgery became models for other CI programs, and formed the basis for ACO initiatives. Further, neurosurgery took the lead in developing the Service Line concept, coordinating program development across the system, organizing providers, and setting quality goals.
As early as 2008, neurosurgeons partnered with Memorial Hermann to discuss opportunities for quality improvement, develop protocols and pathways, and improve operational efficiency through cost savings. The initial plan included determining the right outcome measures, the right data sources, and the right opportunities for improvement (this quality initiative is reviewed in another paper in this Supplement). 29 Metrics were selected and reviewed on a monthly basis and opportunities for vendor consolidation projects were discussed. Under a comanagement agreement (a legal contract, reviewed in another paper in this Supplement) 7 , a committee was formed, chaired by the senior author, with membership guidelines and a commitment to report and review quality data. Three subcommittees were formed: 1 to oversee quality efforts and peer review across the entire system and another 2 to address spinal and cranial implants. The goal of the implant committees was to consolidate vendors used, and negotiate cost savings in exchange for volume.
When the spinal implant committee met, for example, more than 10 vendors had spinal implant products at Memorial Hermann hospitals. The subcommittee decided to reduce that to 2 vendors and requested competitive bids with a commitment to use the selected products exclusively. This negotiation, the first such partnership between physicians and this hospital system, was highly successful with a subsequent 100% compliance rate among the neurosurgeons.
Quality programs were also successful, leading to consistent and sustained improvements in multiple measures such as mortality and infection rates (data are presented in another paper in this Supplement). 29 Further, decreased complications and improvements in length of stay coupled with implant cost savings led to dramatic increases in efficiency. Over a 5-year period, a consistent drop in the total cost for neurosurgical hospitalizations was noted. Two examples are provided in Figures 5 and 6 , for hospitalization costs involving cervical and lumbar surgery. With the development of the MHACO, an opportunity arose to evolve and extend these programs under the ACO infrastructure (which provides significant legal advantages over the comanagement model). A service line agreement was developed under the ACO umbrella, which allows the hospital to legally provide physician support for the work of performance improvement. Currently, the initial neurosurgery effort has expanded to become the Neurosciences Service Line, an integrated network of providers involving inpatient and outpatient neurology, neurocritical care, neuroendovascular surgery, neuro-oncology, pain management, and neuroradiation programs.
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